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On Moral Compromise
1. Introduction
The central topic of Véronique Zanetti's article is moral compromise. As I
understand Zanetti, a compromise could only be called a `moral compromise' if
(i) it does not originate under coercive conditions, (ii) it involves conﬂict whose
subject matter is moral, and (iii) the parties support the solution found for
what they take to be moral reasons rather than strategic interests.1
A moral compromise diﬀers from an `oﬀensive strategic compromise', under
which the parties have no principled commitment to the compromise, but adopt
it for merely strategic reasons. They are willing to go on the oﬀensive and adjust
it if more favorable conditions obtain. This is what John Rawls calls a modus
vivendi.
As Zanetti explains it, a compromise is diﬀerent than a consensus, where
parties see the resolution as their ﬁrst best option. In a compromise, the parties
negotiate (or a decision is reached on) a resolution that is seen as acceptable,
but not optimal, for each party. The parties modify their principle of action or
their objective in the face of their continuing disagreement (426).
A moral compromise can be seen as midway between consensus and a strate-
gic compromise (4267). With a moral compromise, the parties do not come to
have consensus on their ﬁrst best views. For Zanetti, a moral compromise is not
a full consensus because the parties continue to disagree on the content of the
moral matters they take to be important.
There are two main contentions by Zanetti that I wish to challenge in this
comment. First, John Rawls speaks of the parties having an `overlapping con-
sensus' that includes a shared standard of justice. Zanetti ﬁnds this to be an
idealisation of what occurs, in a negative sense, since it assumes too much con-
sensus and leaves out real world conﬂict. In contrast to Rawls, Zanetti contends
that we seek consensus on one aim (social peace) but moral compromise on
at least two other matters (the substantive content of norms and the decision-
taking procedure by which we reach this substantive content) (424). Second,
1 I combine the conditions on pages 426 and 428 of Zanetti 2011.
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Zanetti illustrates her views on moral compromise by returning often to the
example of German abortion law: The classic example of a genuine moral com-
promise is ﬁrst-trimester abortion. Contemporary German jurisdiction provides
women with the possibility to have an `illegal though punishment-exempt' abor-
tion within the ﬁrst three months of pregnancy. (427)
In the sections below, I oﬀer three criticisms of Zanetti. First, Zanetti ignores
how some parties may not have reason to seek social peace at all. Zanetti's claim
that there is consensus on the aim of social peace can involve idealising away
from disagreement in a manner that Zanetti accuses Rawls of. Second, even if
there is consensus on the aim of seeking social peace, this leaves open the pos-
sibility of disagreement about which society diﬀerent people should belong to.
This idealises away from real world conﬂict concerning borders. Indeed, Zanetti
does not mention that her `central example' of moral disagreement, the Ger-
man abortion compromise, was enacted in the wake of German reuniﬁcation.
Third, there are at least two things that can be called the `German abortion
compromise'. The compromise that Zanetti speaks of was imposed by the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court. The court declared unconstitutional a law
passed in 1992 that had been negotiated in parliament. Zanetti does not dwell
on this lack of democratic credentials. Even the substance of the court-imposed
solution is itself a dubious example of a moral compromise between parties based
on what is acceptable to their reason.
2.
Zanetti claims that consensus on social peace is something the parties all seek,
in that all parties desire to exist under a social order of norms. In this section,
I ask: does this consensus only arise if we leave out disagreement by certain
parties who do not favor instituting a social order of norms?
Zanetti discusses moral contractualism, which ideally demands that all norms
must be justiﬁed according to the interests of all those relevantly aﬀected. The
question of the metanorm for legitimating individual norms must itself be pro-
cedurally decided, and must emerge from a contract (430). Zanetti says that the
criterion of the justiﬁcation of norms ideally refers to unanimity, but in nonideal
conditions this may not be what the parties desire (430).
Zanetti invokes Peter Stemmer's account here, who says: A society of people
must desire this norm, and bring it into existence. (Stemmer 2004, quoted in
Zanetti 2011, 430) Zanetti adds: In other words, a society of people should
decide if the requirement of legitimacy which it seeks should be the highest
(everyone should agree reasonably to the norms) or should be at a lower level
(the norms should be in the interest of the majority). (430) Stemmer says
that residents in the state of nature would realize that if they subjected each
individual norm to a unanimity requirement, then the following problem arises:
if some individuals would rather kill than be protected from killing (or would
rather rape than be protected from rape), then it is not in their interest to
assent to the norm. These are among the most urgent rules that need to be
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justifed and enacted for a stable social order (Stemmer 2004, 491). If each norm
is individually subject to a unanimity requirement, then these urgent norms
remain unjustiﬁable. Zanetti indicates that this result could not be desireable
to anyone (430).
This account leaves me puzzled. I understand why those individuals, who
prefer protection from injury to being able to injure others, would not want
other individuals, who preferred to remain free to injure others even if they re-
mained unprotected from injury, to be able to veto such norms. Those desiring a
stable social order, if they were to reason about it, would desire a non-unanimity
requirement. While some of these assenters would want a majority veto require-
ment, others may want a super-majority veto requirement. And a compromise
must be reached among these parties. So in this sense I understand what Zanetti
means when speaking about compromise on procedure.
Zanetti's argument established that all who desire social order should desire
that individual norms not be assessed by a unanimity rule. Zanetti does not
consider what to do when not all desire to live under a social order. She seems
to simply assume all have this desire. However, some may prefer not to be
subject to a system of morality.2 Why will these dissenters desire a procedure
which revokes the unanimity requirement, when the purpose of compromising
was for the aim of social order?
Further, if the legitimacy of the metanorm arises from the desire of people,
how can the majority bind the minority here? Zanetti and Stemmer problemat-
ically speak of society as if it pre-existed the contract. For Locke (1988, II: 96),
the community only has the power to decide as a body by majority, if and once
the community is ﬁrst formed through the unanimous consent of all individuals.
For Locke, there needs to be unanimous agreement to form a society in which
the majority binds the minority. Further, since Zanetti thinks that even the
metanorm must emerge from a contract, I do not see how Zanetti would endorse
a pre-contractual natural duty to form a society with one's neighbors or those
with whom one cooperates.3
Zanetti is idealising away disagreement when she speaks of consensus on
social peace. Zanetti is sensitive to disagreement about substantive norms of
justice and metanorms about how to justify these substantive norms; why is it
justiﬁed to leave this other sort of disagreement aside?
3.
Second, even granting that every individual seeks social peace, there is the fur-
ther question of with whom they seek social peace. What if there is consensus
on the principle of social peace (that everyone should belong to some political
2 Stemmer 2004, 495f., considers this possibility, and says it can be justiﬁed to impose
norms on the dissenters.
3 On such a natural duty, see Waldron 1996. Stemmer 2004, 489, says the contractualist
knows no natural rights or duties.
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order) but not consensus on social unity (that these people should belong to this
or that particular society)?
Zanetti's story relies on the assumption that all would or should agree to be
part of a social order. However, Zanetti seems to silently presuppose a further
consensus not simply on `social peace' but also a consensus on `social unity' (the
desire to live together in this particular society). Any account of how a political
society comes to legitimately impose norms is going to face this `particularity
requirement': why is it that this particular political society can impose these
norms for a particular party?4
Zanetti criticizes Rawls' idealisation of actors as not matching the real world.
Zanetti says that Rawls achieves an overlapping consensus on justice only by
leaving out the `unreasonable' parties who desist from such a consensus on the
sense of justice (432). This seems a sensible criticism, as Rawls excludes much
real world conﬂict. But the same criticism applies to Zanetti's apparent assump-
tion about consensus about which state we belong to (which is implicit in the
idea that we have consensus about social peace). Issues like this are central to
current debates in political obligation, secession, and territorial rights, issues
that cause much conﬂict in today's worlds. My point is not that we never have
consensus on the end of social peace, but that Zanetti, like Rawls, may call it
consensus by leaving out those who are not part of the consensus. By her own
criteria for criticizing Rawls, this can be idealising theory, in a negative sense.
It might be objected that a concern for boundaries and social unity is marginal
to the types of cases that Zanetti discusses. However, what she calls her central
example of moral compromise, the German abortion compromise, arose in the
wake of the process of German reuniﬁcation in 1990. Such diﬀerences almost
held up the uniﬁcation treaty. Consensus or disagreement about social unity,
rather than simply social peace, played a key role here.
At the time of reuniﬁcation, West Germans in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many faced much stricter regulations on abortion than did East Germans. East
Germans in the German Democratic Republic had the right to abortion on de-
mand in the ﬁrst trimester. In 1974 in West Germany, the Social Democrats
pushed through parliament an act to liberalize abortion law in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Under the 1974 Reform Act, abortion would have been legal
in the ﬁrst trimester if women consulted a counseling service (Werner 1996, 582).
However, in 1975 the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany declared the law
unconstitutional and void. The Court invoked an objective hierarchy of value
to declare the state must protect unborn life. Under the 1976 law passed in
accord with this decision, West Germans were allowed to have an abortion only
if doctors determined that one of four situations (or `indications') were present
(584).5
4 I take the phrase particularity requirement from Simmons 2001, 68. See also Stilz
2009, 6.
5 The indications were (1) the life of the mother was at stake, (2) the presence of genetic
deformities, (3) a pregnancy had resulted from a criminal act like rape or incest, (4) and
where the stress on the mother would be so severe that it would unreasonable to expect her
to have the child (Werner 1996). This `social indication' would be commonly invoked, but
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Diﬀerences on abortion almost held up the treaty on reuniﬁcation, with ne-
gotiations lasting until the day the treaty was signed. It was agreed that the
East and the West would temporarily keep their laws after reuniﬁcation until
the parliament could make a new law for all of Germany (589590).
East German women were used to viewing abortion on demand as a right,
and East German feminists were not keen to simply adopt West German laws
on the subject (as happened in most other areas) (Ferree/Maleck-Lewy 2000,
100). While it may not be plausible to think of an individual who does not care
about social peace at all, it is plausible to think of an East German feminist who
would have preferred living under a more liberal abortion law in an independent
East Germany to living under a stricter abortion law in a uniﬁed Germany.
By assuming a consensus on social unity rather than social peace, Zanetti
idealises away from such conﬂicts, and the limits of the consensus. Any com-
promise (moral or non-moral) in Germany on abortion was likely not simply for
social peace, but also for the goal of social unity (in the sense of a social peace
within a uniﬁed Germany, rather than West Germans seeking social peace in
West Germany and East Germans in East Germany).
4.
In this section, I question whether Zanetti's central example of moral compro-
mise, the German abortion case, is indeed an instance of moral compromise, in
the sense of it being grounded in part out of respect for what others will accept.
To show this, I need to explain some background left unexamined by Zanetti.
After uniﬁcation, parliament passed the Pregnant Women's and Families' Aid
Act in June 1992. This was to apply to all of Germany. It was less conservative
than the old law in West Germany but not as liberal as the law had been in East
Germany. This Act arose from the `Group Proposal' developed by women politi-
cians, and supported by for the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, some
Western Christian Democrats, and many of the Christian Democrats from East
Germany (Ferree/Maleck-Lewy 2000, 99100). Such a coalition was possible be-
cause party discipline was not in eﬀect on this issue (Werner 1996, 590591).
Abortion in the ﬁrst trimester was declared not illegal (nicht rechtswidrig)
(593), provided women went to counselors who made sure they had adequately
deliberated. Ultimately the choice would be up to the women, unlike in the old
West German law. Additionally, there would be further child support to allow
women to have kids (though this support would be less than East Germans had
received under socialism).
The rhetoric of the parliamentary compromise was `help, not punishment',
saying that counseling and support would be a superior means to punishment
in preventing abortion. It was thought this would enable the law to pass consti-
tutional muster, as the dignity of unborn human life might be upheld through
alternate means. Some East German feminists attempted, without success, to
since doctors made the determination about whether an indication was present, its application
varied in diﬀerent areas of West Germany.
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push an alternative discourse, denying that abortion need be seen by society
as about protection of life at all.6 Many West German feminists pushed the
compromise because they thought that any improvement would be better than
nothing (Ferree/Maleck-Lewy 2000, 100).
Whatever claim the 1992 act has to being called the result of a democratic
negotiation cannot be invoked by Zanetti. This is because when Zanetti talks
about moral compromise on abortion, she is not talking about this parliamentary
compromise. The 1992 act never went into eﬀect, as it was declared unconsti-
tutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court in May 1993 (101). The
court said that the Act impermissibly declared that that abortion was not ille-
gal (Werner 1996, 593).7 The objective value of life required that the dignity of
all life be upheld, and the Court said this entailed that abortion must generally
be considered a felony.8 Still, the court said abortion could still be exempt from
punishment in the ﬁrst trimester if a woman underwent mandatory counseling
orientated toward preserving life. What Zanetti is discussing is the substance of
a decision reached by a court (or the 1995 law passed in accord with the court's
decision). This questions the democratic credentials of her central case and calls
into question whether this is an example of a moral compromise, in the sense of
acting out of what is acceptable to others.
This can be shown by asking why the court felt the need to move from the par-
liamentary compromise (where abortion was not unlawful in the ﬁrst trimester
if women went through counselling) to a solution that was similar, except for the
following. The court said that the counselling could not be neutral (as the 1992
Act might be interpreted to allow), but had to be explicitly orientated towards
protecting life. It was up to the woman to ultimately decide, in the sense that
she was exempted from punishment. Nonetheless, the action must be considered
illegal.9 One of the Court's main concerns seemed to be expressive: abortion
is not to be taken as acceptable. In other words, disagreement from a strongly
liberal or feminist standpoint is explicitly ruled to be out of order. The objective
value of life must be upheld. The basis of tolerance is most deﬁnitely not its
acceptability to these others. If anything it is the opposite.
I question whether Zanetti adequately distinguishes between two types of
moral reasons which might be present in a moral compromise. The ﬁrst type of
reason grounds one's acceptance of second best solutions in terms of what others
can accept. Zanetti's article begins by highlighting this type of moral reason.10
Above I criticized reliance on this type of reason in Zanetti's abortion case.
The second type of moral reason is not essentially concerned with the dis-
agreement of others. The prime example of this second type is consequentialist
considerations. Zanetti speaks about the second type of reason when discussing
6 One East German feminist argued in parliament that a woman might see a fetus as a
parasitical mass of cells (Ferree/Maleck-Lewy 2000, 100).
7 Since Zanetti refers to the `illegal-but-exempt-from punishment' solution, she cannot be
referring to the parliamentary compromise.
8 Absent certain situations such as incest, genetic deformity, and rape.
9 Additionally, the court banned public funding of most abortions.
10 Zanetti speaks of this type at the beginning of the article, and it appears as if this might
be the only type (423).
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why a conservative might agree to the illegal-yet-punishment-exempt compro-
mise. He or she might be concerned about abortion tourism or back-alley abor-
tions. He or she might see counselling as a way to save unborn life by convincing
women they should not have an abortion; this counselling requires exemption
from punishment. Nonetheless, perhaps this can be said to be a compromise,
done with regret. If the conservative could ﬁnd good ways to stop women from
seeking illegal or foreign abortions, he or she might do so.
Yet in her discussion of abortion, and even when discussing consequentialist
reasoning, Zanetti speaks as if this illegal-yet-punishment-exempt solution is a
moral compromise between two parties: the liberal and the conservative. The
liberal, says Zanetti, who sees abortion as a private matter up to the woman
must, in this sense, concede on the issue of the time limit and accept obligatory
consulting aimed at preserving life. The conservative must depart from his
categorical prohibition on abortion (427).
However, the conservative who concedes to the more permissive abortion
law on consequentialist grounds (the second type of moral reason) need not
and probably does not do so on the grounds that it would be acceptable to
others involved (the ﬁrst type of moral reason) (423). The conservative may be
compromising, and compromising for moral reasons, but he or she may not be
compromising with anyone on the grounds that the compromise is acceptable to
the others.
The conservative may have a reason to not punish all abortions, regardless
of whether anyone disagrees with him in principle. It could be the case that
everyone in the society is a conservative in principle, and all think abortion is
murder. After all, plenty of people do acts they think wrong, from weakness of
will or because they act on non-moral motives.
What reasons does the liberal have? Why would the liberal not jump to
revise this settlement as soon as they could? At least the conservative may have
consequentialist reasons. Indeed, East German feminists saw the parliamentary
compromise as worse than the abortion law that existed previously in East Ger-
many (Ferree/Maleck-Lewy 2000). Zanetti might answer that the liberal (and
the conservative) both can have reasons based on respect for democratic proce-
dure, but as I have mentioned, this seems doubtful in this case given that this
was imposed by the court as a reﬂection of an objective hierarchy of values.
The conservative may simply have a tolerance based not on respect for the
opinion of others, but a permissive type of tolerance, where it is seen as too
disruptive to social order for the majority to enforce the correct conception.11
The tolerance here seems to be one-sided and non-reciprocal. The conser-
vative may abide by the `compromise', but not because they respect the moral
reasoning of others. Rather, the conservative might judge that toleration would
bring less harm than would an attempt to impose values. Meanwhile, the liberal
may simply tell herself that this is the best she can get now. But this is not the
attitude of moral compromise. The liberal may renew her ﬁght when she can.
The conservative might not renew the ﬁght once the balance of power shifts, but
only because of a belief in the harm caused by state action given the frailty of
11 On the permissive versus respect conception of tolerance, see Forst 2004, 315316.
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human nature. His or her reasons need not involve respecting that other human
beings reason diﬀerently. If this can be called moral compromise, it does not
quite seem to be the type of compromise described by Zanetti.
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